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I
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n spite of its apparent benign nature, maritime blockade has evolved over 
the past century to become one of the deadliest methods of warfare that 
modern militaries can employ. From the catastrophic Hunger Blockade that 
was imposed against Germany in the final years of World War I,1 to the hu-
manitarian disaster caused by the U.N. sanctions regime against Iraq,2 and 
the contemporary tragedy that is Yemen,3 history has demonstrated that 
when vulnerable States are cut off from access to foodstuffs and other forms 
of humanitarian assistance, the civilian populations can be subjected to se-
vere suffering in the form of starvation and disease.4 
The origins of the law of blockade are found in siege warfare, a strategy 
that is characterized by the “deliberate infliction of extreme deprivation.”5 
From the sieges of the early Peloponnesian conflicts of the fifth century BCE 
through the siege of Dubrovnik in 1991,6 naval forces have played a vital role 
in helping ground forces by engaging in seaward sieges, conducting naval 
bombardment, and preventing besieged localities from replenishment by sea. 
Because the early practice of blockades was directly linked to siege, 
blockades rarely interfered with maritime traffic outside of the immediate 
cordoned area.7 However, the growing importance of maritime trade and 
                                                                                                                      
1. Spotlights on History: The Blockade of Germany, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES: THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/ 
blockade.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2019). 
2. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
3. See Phillip J. Drew, Blockade? A Legal Assessment of the Maritime Interdiction of Yemen’s 
Ports, 24 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 35 (2019). 
4. See George Alfred Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 INTERNATIONAL LAW-
YER 228, 237 (1970) 
Where a country literally cannot produce sufficient food provisions, despite the allocation 
of available resources to food production, to prevent starvation without additional imported 
food, and where food imports are effectively blockaded, thus causing food shortages and 
human starvation . . . such a blockade can be regarded as ‘starvation’ in the sense of an 
active ‘means of war.’ 
5. Sean Watts, Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege: A Study of the Oxford Guidance on 
Relief Actions, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 4 (2019). 
6. See, e.g., Srdja Pavlovic, Reckoning: The 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik and the Consequences of the 
“War for Peace”, 5 SPACES OF IDENTITY 55 (2005). 
7. Michael N. Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective, 2 JOUR-
NAL OF LEGAL STUDIES (UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY) 21, 24 (1991). 
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advancements in naval technology during the Renaissance necessitated sig-
nificant changes in doctrines and strategies. Recognizing that maritime com-
merce had become a critical component of security for many countries and 
principalities, naval powers began to develop new strategies for isolating en-
emies and disrupting their trade. It was because of this changing environ-
ment that the tactic of seaward sieges began a transformation to the new 
form of maritime warfare known as blockade. 
Historians generally agree that the Dutch blockade against Flemish ports 
in 1584 was the first modern blockade.8 By placaat (proclamation), the Dutch 
sovereign announced that all Flanders ports under the control of Spain were 
“under siege from the sea . . . [and] that no commerce would be allowed 
entry.”9 Further, the Dutch would treat any merchants undertaking to “carry 
to the Spaniards provisions or any other goods whatsoever” as enemies and 
their vessels and cargoes would be subject to seizure.10 The Dutch blockade 
signaled a departure from seaward sieges in three particular ways: first, the 
blockade extended to an entire coastline rather than just a besieged city; sec-
ond, it did not include the bombardment of the coastline; and, third, it served 
as notice to mariners that the Dutch Navy was prepared to seize all goods 
(no matter their nature, purpose, or use) from neutrals attempting to trade 
in the Flanders area.11 Although many of the characteristics of early blockade 
were abandoned when the Dutch implemented their new strategy, the one 
element of siege warfare that survived was the requirement that no goods or 
vessels whatsoever would be permitted to pass through a blockade. 
Although the new practice was initially criticized as a violation of neutral 
rights and the freedom of the seas, other European naval powers soon cop-
ied the model of blockade developed by the Dutch. However, even as its use 
became increasingly common, the rules surrounding the application of 
blockade remained underdeveloped, causing significant consternation 
among neutral countries. The main aspect of blockade that consistently frus-
trated neutrals was the notion of “paper blockades,” the practice of declaring 
                                                                                                                      
8. PHILLIP DREW, THE LAW OF MARITIME BLOCKADE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
37 (2017) (citing Thomas David Jones, The International Law of Blockade—A Measure of Naval 
Economic Interdiction, 26 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL 759, 765 (1983). 
9. JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 325 (1914). 
10. JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PART TWO—WAR 170 (1907). 
11. DREW, supra note 8, at 38–39. 
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blockades in areas where the blockading forces did not, or could not, dedi-
cate enough naval resources to impose their will.12 Disaffection with this 
practice was such that it became one of the four main topics addressed in 
the world’s first multilateral treaty on the law of warfare, the Paris Declara-
tion of 1856.13 This Declaration included the requirement that, “Blockades, 
in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.”14 
While the codification of the requirement for effectiveness served to 
temporarily pacify some of the neutrals’ resistance to the concept of block-
ade in the mid-1800s, its adoption as the centerpiece of blockade law would 
have unintended consequences that the plenipotentiaries to the Congress of 
Paris could not have foreseen in 1856. 
One of the effects of the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was the mass migration of rural populations to urban 
centers.15 Rapid urban expansion, “accompanied by an equally dramatic ex-
pansion of the population overall,”16 required a massive expansion of agri-
cultural production. An important side effect of the dependence on intensive 
agricultural practices was that the supply of fertilizers became critical to en-
suring that farms could produce enough food to keep the populations of 
cities fed. Further, in some countries, traditional food-producing farms had 
been converted to cash crops required for textiles and the manufacture of 
other commercial goods. These changes left many of Europe’s economies 
reliant on the importation of food and fertilizers to sustain their populations. 
The blockade of the Confederate States by the Union Navy during the 
American Civil War was the first significant blockade imposed against an 
agricultural economy that had been transformed from subsistence farming 
to one of cash crops, mostly cotton, tobacco, and sugarcane. At the begin-
ning of the Civil War in 1861, Confederate States were almost entirely reliant 
on imports for their food supply. By the end of the first year of the war, 
“dairy products, such as butter and cheese, which had been imported from 
                                                                                                                      
12. CARL J. KULSRUD, MARITIME NEUTRALITY TO 1780: A HISTORY OF THE MAIN 
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING NEUTRALITY AND BELLIGERENCY TO 1780, at 238–43 (2000). 
13. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MAR-
TENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1055 
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
14. Id. ¶ 4. 
15. Remi Jedwab, Luc Christiaensen & Marina Gindelsky, Demography, Urbanization and 
Development: Rural Push, Urban Pull and . . . Urban Push?, 98 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS 
6, 6–7 (2017). 
16. Id. at 7. 
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New England; citrus fruits, dates, pineapples, and vegetables, which had 
been imported from Bermuda and the Caribbean Islands [had become] 
scarce.”17 Many residents living in Southern cities were already beginning to 
feel the effects of starvation.18 Ultimately, by the closing days of the war in 
1865, starvation had become a primary factor “in breaking the will of the 
civilian population, the soldiers, and their commanding officers to continue 
the war. The military effect of the food shortage was that it encouraged the 
South to surrender.”19 
The blockade of the South proved that a blockade could be extremely 
effective against vulnerable economies. In particular, a blockade could play 
a significant role in defeating an enemy if it could: (a) deprive the enemy of 
the material necessary for it to wage effective warfare; (b) cut off the supply 
of foodstuffs and other necessary commodities so as to render the war in-
tolerable to the enemy’s people; and (c) through the application of consistent 
pressure, render the enemy unable to sustain the economic strain that the 
cost of war imposes.20 
As demonstrated during the blockade of Germany during World War II 
some fifty years later, the lesson that “at some point civilian starvation will 
produce a military effect; at some point the government of the starved pop-
ulation will capitulate and sue for peace,”21 would again prove true. The con-
sequences for the German population were disastrous. 
 
II.THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BLOCKADE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
The dawn of the twentieth century bore witness to incredible changes for 
the world’s major economies. Having become heavily reliant on imported 
goods to keep their industries running and their people fed, European pow-
ers began to invest extraordinary amounts of money and resources in their 
navies. The era of the battleship had arrived, and with it, the naval powers 
were able to project their influence and to control the sea lines of communi-
                                                                                                                      
17. Michael O. Varhola, Squeezing the South into Submission, NEW YORK TIMES: OPIN-
IONATOR (Aug. 14, 2011), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/squeezing-
the-south-into-submission/. 
18. Mary Elizabeth Massey, The Food and Drink Shortage on the Confederate Homefront, 26 
NORTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL REVIEW 306, 313–15 (1949). 
19. Mudge, supra note 4, at 240. 
20. L.A. Altherly-Jones, The Military Effects of Attacks on Commerce, in 1 PROBLEMS OF 
THE WAR: PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY IN THE YEAR 1916, at 91, 94 (1916). 
21. Mudge, supra note 4, at 244. 
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cation that were vital to their respective economies. Accompanying this mas-
sive expansion was the concern that should war break out, the paucity of law 
surrounding naval warfare, and, most importantly, neutral trade, could result 
in widespread disruption of maritime commerce. In response to these con-
cerns, the issues of blockade, contraband, neutrality, and prize courts were 
high priorities for the 1907 Peace Conference in The Hague. 
The debates during the Peace Conference confirmed there was substan-
tial disagreement about the rules respecting the interdiction of neutral mari-
time trade during war and the mechanisms under which prize law should be 
adjudicated.22 Because of the complexity of the issues, it was decided that the 
most contentious topics of naval warfare would be addressed in a meeting 
subsequent to the Peace Conference. With a goal of resolving the outstand-
ing issues from the Peace Conference, the principal naval powers met in 
London in 1908 and 1909. In terms of the development of international law, 
the London process was quite remarkable. During four months of meetings 
and negotiations, the delegates achieved resolution on several of the most 
challenging issues; ultimately creating the document widely referred to as the 
London Declaration.23 In spite of the good will shown by the Parties to the 
negotiations, the Declaration encountered significant opposition in the 
United Kingdom. In response to declining support in the House of Com-
mons, suspicion and mistrust toward European powers, and a belief that a 
war with Germany was looming, on December 12, 1911, the House of Lords 
refused to ratify The Naval Prize Bill.24 Parliament’s failure to ratify the Bill 
was ultimately fatal to the Declaration of London. As a consequence, the 
one and only attempt to codify blockade in the modern era failed. But, even 
though the Declaration never came into force, many of its provisions have 
been recognized as customary international law. 
As was the case with virtually all international treaties negotiated during 
the first half of the twentieth century, the issue of the protection of civilians 
during armed conflict was not addressed in the London process.25 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                      
22. James L. Tryon, The International Prize Court and Code, 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL 604, 
604–05 (1911). 
23. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. T.S. 
338, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 1113 (never entered into 
force). 
24. United Kingdom House of Lords Debates (House of Lords 1911) 895. 
25. But see, e.g., MARCO SASSÒLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES, CON-
TROVERSIES, AND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE 8 (noting that “[s]ome 
rules contained in the Hague Regulations adopted in 1899 and revised in 1907 protected 
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the focus of the Declaration’s blockade provisions was on the five opera-
tional criteria for the establishment of a blockade: (1) it must be effective; (2) 
it must be declared either by the blockading Power or by the naval authorities 
acting in its name; (3) it must be notified to belligerent and neutral States; (4) 
it must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations; and (5) it must not 
bar access to the ports or coastlines of neutral States.26 
In many respects, the blockade provisions of the London Declaration 
did little more than amplify the statement on effectiveness made in the Dec-
laration of Paris.27 Importantly, the London Declaration reemphasized the 
concept that a blockade was an operation in which a belligerent naval force 
prevents all vessels (enemy, neutral, and friendly) from entering or exiting 
specified ports or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the con-
trol of, the enemy.28 To that end, the law of blockade, as set out and practiced 
in the twentieth century, made no allowance for humanitarian assistance. 
Similarly, the law of contraband paid little attention to the plight of civilians,29 
providing that foodstuffs could, “without notice, be treated as contraband 
of war, under the name of conditional contraband.”30 
The first significant test of twentieth-century blockade law occurred dur-
ing World War I. Although the belligerent naval powers, at the behest of 
neutral States, originally affirmed their intention to abide by the provisions 
                                                                                                                      
civilians in occupied territories,” but conceding “[c]ivilains threatened by attacks or bom-
bardments . . . were covered only very summarily in 1899 and 1907 . . . .”). 
26. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, supra note 23, arts. 3, 5, 8, 11, 18. 
27. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, supra note 13, ¶ 4. 
28. DREW, supra note 8, at 10. 
29. The relationship between blockade law and the law of contraband is one of the 
most misunderstood aspects of the law regulating maritime operations, as many authors and 
practitioners fail to understand that two separate and incompatible bodies of law govern 
blockade and contraband, respectively. As Douglas Guilfoyle notes, under the law of naval 
warfare a belligerent may take a “range of [interdiction] measures against neutral shipping. 
It may forbid all commerce with specified ports or coastlines (blockade). It may prohibit 
certain listed goods from being shipped to the enemy (contraband).” See Douglas Guilfoyle, 
The Mavi Marmara Incident and Blockade in Armed Conflict, 81 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 171, 194 (2011). It cannot, however, do both simultaneously. Thus, any 
discussion of contraband in the context of blockade is incorrect. 
30.  Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, supra note 23, art. 24. It should 
also be noted that articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded were included as 
items that could not be declared as contraband. They could, however, in case of urgent 
military necessity and subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned if they were 
destined for enemy forces. 
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of the London Declaration,31 the German declaration of unlimited mine war-
fare destroyed all pretexts of a limited naval war.32 In response, the United 
Kingdom began a series of escalatory maneuvers and ultimately instituted a 
full blockade against Germany.33 The Hunger Blockade, as it has come to be 
known, lasted until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in July 1919, during 
which time Germany suffered its worst famine since the Thirty Years War.34 
Twenty years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the European 
powers again found themselves embroiled in conflict. As was the case in 
World War I, the naval conflict of World War II escalated quickly, with the 
belligerents attempting to cut each other off from maritime commerce.35 
Neither side could assert naval superiority and the battle for domination of 
the Atlantic Ocean became the longest campaign of the war. Although the 
Germans came remarkably close to completely cutting off the United King-
dom from its essential maritime supply routes,36 its inability to prevent re-
                                                                                                                      
31. See, e.g., Almeric FitzRoy, The King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council, LONDON GA-
ZETTE, Aug. 25, 1914, at 6681–82, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.d0000 
608190;view=1up;seq=651; The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) (Aug. 
10, 1914), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1914, SUPPLEMENT, THE WORLD WAR (Joseph V. Fuller ed., 1928), https://his-
tory.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914Supp/d705. 
32. Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State (Aug. 7, 1914), in PAPERS RE-
LATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, THE 
WORLD WAR (Joseph V. Fuller ed., 1928), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-
ments/frus1914Supp/d704. 
33. See Almeric FitzRoy, The King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council, SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE LONDON GAZETTE, July 8, 1916, at 6821–22, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/Lon-
don/issue/29657/supplement/1. 
34. While historians continue to debate the humanitarian toll of the blockade, the Brit-
ish government estimated that approximately 763,000 wartime deaths in Germany can be 
attributed to starvation caused by the five-year economic strangulation of the country. As 
compared to the combat losses of Germany, estimated at approximately 1.74 million per-
sons, the effects of the blockade are clearly remarkable. Placed in perspective, the 1915–19 
blockade of Germany was responsible for the deaths of more German civilians than was 
the Allied strategic bombing campaign of World War II. For a fuller discussion, see DREW, 
supra note 8, at 46–51. 
35. Id. at 51. Of note, during the interwar years Germany diversified its trading practices 
to reduce its dependence on maritime trade and immunize its economy from the effects of 
blockade. Aided by the development of rail networks, improved highways, and policies 
aimed at increasing food production, Germany ensured that it could satisfy its requirements 
from continental sources. 
36. See, e.g., The Battle of the Atlantic: The Grimmest Period, VETERANS AFFAIRS CANADA, 
https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/second-world-war/battle-atlan-
tic/publication (last updated Feb. 14, 2019). 
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supply from North America allowed the U.K. to survive the war without 
suffering severe food shortages.37 
Although numerous blockades were imposed during conflicts in the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century, most of them were small in size and short 
in duration. That trend, however, changed with the U.N. sanctions enacted 
against Iraq in response to its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Passed unani-
mously by the U.N. Security Council on August 6, 1990, Security Council 
Resolution 661 authorized the banning of all imports and exports of goods 
to and from Iraq.38 Although it was a sanctions regime by law, the interdic-
tion action resembled a blockade in all its facets, with the exception that in 
humanitarian circumstances supplies intended strictly for medical purposes 
and foodstuffs were permissible.39 In 1991, sanctions against Iraq were con-
tinued through Security Council Resolution 687.40 These sanctions were 
strictly and effectively enforced and remained in place until the conclusion 
of the Second Gulf War in 2003. 
With its infrastructure decimated by the Gulf War and an economy that 
was highly dependent on oil exports for revenue, Iraq was particularly vul-
nerable to the effects of this sanctions regime. As was the case with Germany 
in World War I, Iraq’s ability to feed its population was dependent not only 
on the importation of foodstuffs, but also on the external supply of fertilizers 
and farm machinery.41 With these items subjected to sanctions, Iraq faced an 
immediate humanitarian crisis. 
The lessons from the Hunger Blockade apparently did not affect the Se-
curity Council as it contemplated the continuation of sanctions against Iraq 
                                                                                                                      
37. Sujay Kulshrestha, Wartime Rationing During World War II and the Effect of Public Opin-
ion in Great Britain and Austria, 2 INQUIRIES JOURNAL 1, 1 (2010), http://www.inquiriesjour-
nal.com/articles/339/wartime-rationing-during-world-war-ii-and-the-effect-of-public-
opinion-in-great-britain-and-austria. 
38. S.C. Res. 661, ¶¶ 3–4 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
39. Id. ¶ 3. 
40. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
41. Much of Iraq is non-arable desert. As a result, the country relies heavily on imported 
foodstuffs to feed its population. When the U.N. blockade was imposed, virtually all imports 
of food were halted. While immediate government rationing helped to fend off mass star-
vation, the meager diet imposed on the majority of Iraq’s citizenry was barely sufficient to 
meet basic nutritional needs. See, e.g., Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Conse-
quences, 1990–2000, 22 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 205, 209 (2001) (“The blockade had an 
immediate impact on food availability in Iraq, since the country’s dependence on imported 
food was 70%–80% of total caloric intake. The blockade-caused food shortages resulted in 
sharp increases in food prices ranging from 200% to 1800% between August and November 
1990.”). 
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in April 1991. In 1998, a Parliamentary Research Paper produced by the U.K. 
House of Commons reported that “[s]ince the imposition of economic sanc-
tions on Iraq in 1990, the humanitarian situation in Iraq has deteriorated 
significantly . . . there are some 960,000 chronically malnourished children in 
Iraq, representing a rise of 72% since 1991.”42 The following year, the U.N. 
International Children’s Emergency Fund reported, “under-5 mortality more 
than doubled from 56 deaths per 1000 live births (1984-1989) to 131 deaths 
per 1000 live births (1994–99).”43 Likewise, the report found that infant mor-
tality, “defined as the death of children in their first year—increased from 47 
per 1000 live births to 108 per 1000 live births within the same time frame.”44 
Moreover, a 2007 House of Lords report reviewed the effects of the Iraq 
sanctions, concluding, “It is predictable that sanctions which inflict high eco-
nomic costs on a country run by a ruthless government are likely to result in 
severe suffering among the general population even if there are humanitarian 
exemptions and relief programmes.”45 
 
A. The Protection of Civilians 
 
In their Commentary of the Additional Protocols, Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmer-
mann write: 
 
It should be emphasized that the object of a blockade is to deprive the 
adversary of supplies needed to conduct hostilities, and not to starve civil-
ians. Unfortunately it is a well-known fact that all too often civilians, and 
above all children, suffer most as a result.46 
 
According to the traditional law of blockade, a blockading force must “ex-
clude all transit into and out of a defined area or location.”47 There are no 
                                                                                                                      
42. TOM DODD & TIM YOUNGS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE SECTION, 
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY RESEARCH PAPER 98/28: THE IRAQ CRISIS 9 (1998). 
43. Iraq Surveys Show ‘Humanitarian Emergency’, NEWSLINE (Aug. 12, 1999), 
https://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm. 
44. Id. 
45. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF LORDS, 1 THE IMPACT 
OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 20, ¶ 46 (2007). 
46. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 2095 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTO-
COLS]. 
47. Schmitt, supra note 7, at 44. 
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exceptions for any vessels. Accordingly, the traditional law of blockade, 
which is based almost entirely on customary international law, makes no pro-
vision for the relief of civilians. Therefore, to determine if an obligation to 
allow the passage of humanitarian relief exists in contemporary blockade law, 
it is necessary to examine conventional law to see whether it has modified or 
otherwise moderated the operation of the customary law. 
Prior to the World War II, there were virtually no protections for civil-
ians in the law of armed conflict. It was not until 1949 that partial protection 
against the starvation of civilians was recognized by Article 23 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention (GC IV).48 In part, Article 23 provides, 
 
Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consign-
ments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious 
worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, 
even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of 
all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for 
children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.49 
 
Although Article 23 provides considerable protections, it is not without re-
striction, as the Article also states: 
 
The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the 
consignments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condi-
tion that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing: 
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination, 
(b) that the control may not be effective, or 
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or econ-
omy of the enemy . . . .50 
 
Thus, the party that is responsible for controlling access to a locality has the 
power to decide whether relief will be permitted. As Yoram Dinstein has 
argued, “There is patently no requirement of letting through supplies of food 
and clothing to the civilian population in its totality.”51 
                                                                                                                      
48. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
23, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
49. Id. (emphasis added). 
50. Id.; see also 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1139 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
51. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 260 (3d ed. 2016). But see, e.g., Michael Bothe, Legal Expert Opinion 
on The Right to Provide and Receive Humanitarian Assistance in Occupied Territories, NORWEGIAN 
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B. Additional Protocol I 
 
The decades following World War II bore witness to unprecedented growth 
in the sphere of public international law. One of the crowning achievements 
in this era was the adoption of the two Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949,52 and, most importantly for the protection of civilians, 
Part IV of Additional Protocol I (AP I). Making up one-third of the opera-
tional provisions of the Protocol, Part IV (Articles 48–79) addresses the prin-
ciples of distinction,53 proportionality,54 and precautions,55 and sets out rules 
regarding relief actions,56 as well as the protection of objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population.57 
In response to the conflict-induced famines that devastated Eastern Eu-
rope in World War II and the severe suffering of civilian populations sub-
jected to siege warfare, the negotiating teams for the Additional Protocols 
worked to address the issue of the starvation of civilians. Article 54 of AP I 
was the result. In part, the Article provides: 
 
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited; and 
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects in-
dispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, 
agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drink-
ing water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific 
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian popula-
tion or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to 
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.58 
 
Although it would appear that Article 54 prohibits starvation of civilians 
in all situations, there are several arguments that support the notion that it 
                                                                                                                      
REFUGEE COUNCIL (July 15, 2015), https://www.nrc.no/resources/legal-opinions/the-
right-to-provide-and-receive-humanitarian-assistance-in-occupied-territories/. 
52. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
53. AP I, supra note 52, art. 48. 
54. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
55. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
56. Id. art. 70. 
57. Id. art. 54. 
58. Id. 
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does not apply to blockade. The first such contention is found in the word-
ing of paragraph one, which prescribes that the Article only applies if star-
vation of civilians is used as a method of warfare. Under this interpretation, 
because starvation is a side effect rather than the purpose of a blockade, the 
Article does not apply. Moreover, during the negotiations of Part IV, several 
States, including the United Kingdom and France, made a specific effort to 
ensure that the provisions of Article 54 would not apply to blockade.59 This 
intention is specifically stated in Article 49(3), which provides: 
 
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which 
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on 
land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against 
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable 
in armed conflict at sea or in the air.60 
 
The drafters’ determination to ensure that blockade did not fall under 
the umbrella of Article 54(1) was reflected in a Committee III Report that 
stated, “The fact that the paragraph does not change the law of naval block-
ade is made clear by article [49].”61 While the wording of Article 49(3) has 
been the subject of numerous debates, it is notable that the authors of the 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols have concluded that the drafters of the 
Protocol intended to exempt blockade from the starvation provisions.62 
As one looks deeper into Article 54, it may appear that paragraph two 
might apply to blockade. On close examination, however, it becomes clear 
that the provision speaks only to attacking, destroying, or rendering useless 
objects that are already in the possession or locale of the civilian population.63 
It does not allude to the deprivation of certain items, nor does it address 
preventing delivery of essential commodities such as foodstuffs. In this man-
ner, it is apparent that the focus of Article 54(2) is the prohibition against 
employing a scorched earth strategy, a contention supported by the final par-
agraph of Article 54, which states: 
 
                                                                                                                      
59. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
60. AP I, supra note 52, art. 49(3) (emphasis added). 
61. 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–1979), at 279 (1978). 
62. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 46, ¶ 2092 (noting 
that this exemption “appears to be correct”). 
63. AP I, supra note 52, art. 54(2). 
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In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the 
defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the pro-
hibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict 
within such territory under its own control where required by imperative 
military necessity.64 
 
The second provision of AP I that appears to provide humanitarian relief 
to populations subjected to a blockade is Article 70, which states: 
 
If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to 
the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with 
[food and medical supplies], relief actions which are humanitarian and im-
partial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be 
undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief 
actions.65 
 
Unlike Article 23 of GC IV, which mandates that parties are obligated only 
to provide relief to children under 15, expectant mothers, and maternity 
cases,66 Article 70 makes no distinctions between classes of civilians. Rather, 
the Article reflects the “philosophical concept of the equality of human be-
ings, which is actually a basic consequence of the principle of humanity.”67 
Whereas it might appear that Article 70 would, by virtue of the phrase 
“the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the 
conflict, other than occupied territory,”68 obligate blockading forces to per-
mit the passage of food and medical supplies, there are two factors that mit-
igate against this conclusion. The first is the wording of the Article, which 
provides that relief actions are conditional on the agreement of the parties. 
Although the Commentary notes that this provision does not grant parties “ab-
solute and unlimited freedom to refuse their agreement to relief actions,”69 
the Protocol does not provide guidance as to what constitutes a valid reason 
for refusing relief. 
The second restriction on the applicability of Article 70 is that like Article 
54, it runs into the restriction in Article 49(3) suggesting that Part IV of AP 
                                                                                                                      
64. Id. art. 54(5). 
65. Id. art. 70(1). 
66. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
23, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
67. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 46, ¶ 2800. 
68. AP I, supra note 52, art. 70. 
69. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 46, ¶ 2805. 
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I does not apply to maritime blockade.70 In the negotiations surrounding AP 
I, there was significant opposition to the extension of Article 70 to block-
ade.71 Evidence of the strong opposition that some States have taken with 
respect to the application of Article 70 is found in the reservations that the 
United Kingdom and France have made to AP I. The U.K. reservation states, 
“It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that this Article does not 
affect the existing rules of naval warfare regarding naval blockade, submarine 
warfare or mine warfare.”72 Likewise, the French reservation provides, “The 
Government of the French Republic considers that Article 70 on relief ac-
tions has no implication on the existing rules in the field of naval war with 
regard to maritime blockade, submarine warfare, or mine warfare.”73 
There are valid arguments to support the proposition that there are no 
obligations under conventional law that require blockading forces to allow 
the passage of relief. Indeed, it can be concluded that, at most, any conven-
tional protections afforded to civilians during blockade are subject to the 
condition that the parties to the conflict have discretion over whether or not 
to permit humanitarian access and assistance. The Swedish International Hu-
manitarian Law Manual sums up the fundamental problem by noting: 
 
Certain states have maintained that the prohibition against starvation shall 
apply without exception which would also mean its application against 
blockade in naval warfare. Other states have claimed that this method of 
warfare is the province of the international law of naval warfare, which, 
                                                                                                                      
70. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
71. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 46, ¶ 1895 
In general the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference were guided by a concern not to 
undertake a revision of the rules applicable to armed conflict at sea . . . . That is why the 
words ‘on land’ were retained [in Article 49(3)] and a second sentence clearly indicating that 
the Protocol did not change international law in such situations was added. 
72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Declaration and Reservations, ¶ 
p, July 2, 2002 [hereinafter U.K. Reservation]. This document is available under the States 
parties listing of the Protocol on the ICRC website. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS, TREATIES, STATES PARTIES, AND COMMENTARIES, https://ihl-data-
bases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470. 
73. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
France, ¶ 17, April 11, 2001 [hereinafter French Declaration]. This document is available 
under the States parties listing of the Protocol on the ICRC website. See INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, TREATIES, STATES PARTIES, AND COMMENTARIES, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470. 
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according to Article 49:3, shall not be affected by the new rules of Addi-
tional Protocol I. There is thus no consensus that the prohibition of star-
vation shall be considered to include maritime blockade.74 
 
With that in mind, an examination of customary law relating to the provision 
of relief in times of blockade is warranted. 
 
III. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND CUSTOMARY LAW IN BLOCKADE 
 
One of the outstanding issues in contemporary blockade law is the question 
of whether and to what extent a blockading force must provide humanitarian 
assistance to a civilian population facing starvation. This issue was brought 
to the forefront in the 1990s, principally because of the disastrous effects the 
U.N. sanctions had on the Iraqi people following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.75 
In part, the suffering of the Iraqi people renewed efforts to incorporate pro-
tections for civilians during blockade. 
The fact that contemporary international humanitarian law might allow 
for the unfettered starvation of civilians by means of blockade has been de-
scribed as untenable,76 with scholars such as Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 
arguing that “if the establishment of a blockade causes the civilian popula-
tion to be inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for 
their survival, the blockading party must provide for free passage of such 
essential supplies.”77 
With a goal of bringing the law of blockade into alignment with contem-
porary international humanitarian law, the drafters of the San Remo Manual 
on International Law Applicable to Conflicts at Sea incorporated protections for 
civilians by building the language of proportionality into the blockade provi-
sions.78 They also included a prohibition against blockades that have the 
                                                                                                                      
74. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICT WITH REFERENCE TO THE SWEDISH TOTAL DEFENCE SYSTEM § 3.2.1.5 (1991). 
75. It is accepted that the sanctions regime imposed in Iraq was not strictly speaking a 
blockade. It was, however, enforced with the same effect and results of a blockade. See 
discussion in DREW, supra note 8, at 58–60. 
76. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 475, 555 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2013). 
77. Id. 
78. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA 179 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995). 
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“sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects 
essential for its survival.”79 
The drafters of the San Remo Manual are commended for recognizing and 
addressing the issue of starvation in blockade. When the working group ex-
perts gathered in 1992, the prevailing attitude in the international community 
was that blockade had been unaffected by the adoption of AP I. This attitude 
left the drafters in a dilemma; they could either accept the status quo, thus 
conceding that the starvation of civilians was an acceptable consequence of 
blockade, or they could attempt to influence customary law by making re-
quirements for the protection of civilians during blockades. In deciding in 
favor of the latter, the San Remo Manual drafters signaled a commitment to 
address the exclusion of blockade from the provisions protecting civilians 
from starvation by the drafters of AP I. Their solution was to include the 
following rules in Articles 102 and 103 of the San Remo Manual: 
 
102. The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if: 
 
(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it 
other objects essential for its survival; or 
(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, ex-
cessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated 
from the blockade. 
 
103. If the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately 
provided with food and other objects essential for its survival, the block-
ading party must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other 
essential supplies, subject to: 
 
(a) the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, un-
der which such passage is permitted; and 
(b) the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be made under 
the local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization 
which offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross.80 
 
The inclusion of Articles 102 and 103 in the San Remo Manual was a bold 
move that promised to invite backlash from legal positivists. It was, however, 
the correct decision, demonstrating a principled, reasonable, and responsible 
                                                                                                                      
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 27. 
 
 
 
Maritime Blockade and Humanitarian Initiatives Vol. 95 
319 
 
 
 
 
 
 
approach that keeps with the spirit of AP I “to reaffirm and develop the 
provisions protecting the victims of armed conflicts and to supplement 
measures intended to reinforce their application.”81 
Although their efforts were clearly lex ferenda, over the past two and a 
half decades, the San Remo Manual provisions on blockade have gained wide 
support from several States that have incorporated these rules into their mil-
itary manuals.82 The fact that there appears to be widespread opinio juris in 
favor of the humanitarian aspects of blockade (at least by many Western 
States), indicates a broader trend to extend humanitarian protection to block-
ade. However, opinio juris cannot conclusively answer whether customary law 
has progressed, as general State practice must also be present.83 
As the International Law Commission has recently affirmed, “Where the 
existence of a general practice accepted as law cannot be established, the 
conclusion will be that the alleged rule of customary international law does 
not exist.”84 It is here that the prospect of the crystallization of the humani-
tarian initiatives for blockade falls somewhat short, principally because there 
have, to date, been no blockade operations in which the humanitarian pro-
visions have been respected. If anything, the interdiction operations imple-
mented in conflicts such as Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen85 suggest that thus far 
respect and concern for civilians has not played a major role in maritime 
interdiction operations.86 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
81. AP I, supra note 52, pmbl. 
82. See, e.g., DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MILITARY MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW RELEVANT TO DANISH ARMED FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 564 (2016); 
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT ¶ 13.74 (2004). 
83. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission: Sev-
entieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 119 (2018) (“To determine the existence and con-
tent of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a 
general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).”). 
84. Id. at 125. 
85. It is accepted that the Yemen interdiction operation is not a blockade. However, it 
is submitted that the complete dismissal of the requirements for humanitarian access and 
assistance by the Saudi-led coalition is indicative of the current obligations with respect to 
the protection of civilians in maritime interdiction operations. See Drew, supra note 3.  
86. For a discussion, see DREW, supra note 8, at 55–62. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
[I]t is to be hoped that the rules relating to blockades will be clarified as 
part of a future revision of certain aspects of the laws of war at sea, a revi-
sion for which there is a great need. Such a re-examination should make it 
possible to duly take into account the principles put forward in the Proto-
col which prohibit starvation as a method of warfare.87 
 
Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg’s contention that it is untenable to 
support an interpretation of AP I Article 49(3) that permits blockades to 
deliberately starve civilian populations88 finds strong support as opinio juris, 
especially within the San Remo Manual and a variety of Western military man-
uals.89 However, statements contained in the Working Group papers for AP 
I and reservations such as those registered by the United Kingdom and 
France,90 combined with the lack of humanitarian practice by States that have 
engaged in blockade and blockade-type operations, suggest that some States 
are quite willing to do so if it will assist in the war effort and render the war 
intolerable to the enemy’s civilian population. For example, Dov Weisglass, 
senior advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated in 2006 that the 
goal of the Israeli blockade against Palestine was “to put the Palestinians on 
a diet, but not to make them die of hunger.”91 
While in the early 1970s there was little to no corporate memory of the 
devastating effects of past hunger blockades, the ensuing decades have pro-
vided the world with numerous examples of blockade and blockade-type op-
erations that have had catastrophic effect. Whether it is Yemen, Gaza, or 
Iraq, the fact that civilians have been targeted as part of a naval interdiction 
strategy is undeniable. 
Starvation is inhumane. There can be no reason or justification for the 
intentional starvation of civilian populations in armed conflict, whether 
                                                                                                                      
87. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 46, ¶ 2093. 
88. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 76, at 555. 
89. See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE 
CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 7.7.2.5 (2017); CHIEF 
OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT 
THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 851 (2001). 
90. U.K. Reservation, supra note 72; French Reservation, supra note 73. 
91. Conal Urquhart, Gaza on Brink of Implosion as Aid Cut-Off Starts to Bite, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 15, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/16/israel. 
 
 
 
Maritime Blockade and Humanitarian Initiatives Vol. 95 
321 
 
 
 
 
 
 
through siege, scorched earth strategies, or blockade. The notion that inno-
cent people can be allowed to starve because another State has deliberately 
blocked humanitarian aid from reaching them defies the very purposes and 
principles of international humanitarian law. 
Despite the efforts of the authors of the San Remo Manual, and the will-
ingness of various States to incorporate its humanitarian provisions into their 
military manuals, it is not possible to conclude that the humanitarian initia-
tives outlined in the Manual have crystalized into customary international 
law. States are responsible for the creation of international law, but thus far, 
few have taken meaningful steps towards bringing the law of maritime block-
ade into the twenty-first century. Instead, many States appear content to ab-
rogate their responsibilities in favor of embracing soft law initiatives that 
they subsequently incorporate into their military manuals. While the adop-
tion of such concepts is progress, the reality is that these initiatives do not 
have the same authority as governmental statements or action. 
In the current political environment, it is unlikely that States could reach 
a broad international agreement on a renewed law of blockade. As such, a 
strong stated commitment by likeminded governments to “take all feasible 
precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian 
life or injury to civilians”92 during blockades and other forms of naval inter-
diction operations would be a positive development. Further, by ensuring 
that their own operations accord with the principles of humanitarianism, and 
refusing to support States or coalitions that violate those principles,93 States 
can influence the development of customary law in a positive manner. Until 
that occurs, the law with respect to humanitarian initiatives will remain un-
settled and States may engage in the deliberate starvation of civilians with 
little or no concern that they will be held accountable for their actions. 
 
                                                                                                                      
92. AP I, supra note 52, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
93. The International Law Commission stated, “inaction may count as practice . . . 
[however] only deliberate abstention from acting may serve such a role: the State in question 
needs to be conscious of refraining from acting in a given situation, and it cannot simply be 
assumed that abstention from acting is deliberate.”  International Law Commission, supra 
note 83, at 133. 
